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Drug-resistant Candida auris C. Type: Fungus About: C. Clostridioides difficile C. Type: Bacteria Also known as: C. Carbapenem-resistant Enterobacterales CRE. Drug-resistant Neisseria gonorrhoeae N. Type: Bacteria Also known as: Campy About: Campylobacter usually causes diarrhea often bloody , fever, and abdominal cramps, and can spread from animals to people through contaminated food, especially raw or undercooked chicken. Drug-resistant Candida Species. Type: Fungus About: Dozens of Candida species—a group of fungi—cause infections, ranging from mild oral and vaginal yeast infections to severe invasive infections.

ESBL-producing Enterobacterales. ESBL stands for extended-spectrum beta-lactamase. ESBLs are enzymes that break down commonly used antibiotics, such as penicillins and cephalosporins, making them ineffective. Vancomycin-resistant Enterococcus VRE. Type: Bacteria About: Enterococci can cause serious infections for patients in healthcare settings, including bloodstream, surgical site, and urinary tract infections.

Multidrug-resistant Pseudomonas aeruginosa P. Type: Bacteria About: P. Drug-resistant nontyphoidal Salmonella. Type: Bacteria About: Nontyphoidal Salmonella can spread from animals to people through food, and usually causes diarrhea, fever, and abdominal cramps. Drug-resistant Salmonella serotype Typhi. Type: Bacteria Also known as: Typhoid fever About: Salmonella Typhi causes a serious disease called typhoid fever, which can be life-threatening.

Drug-resistant Shigella. Type: Bacteria About: Shigella spreads in feces through direct contact or through contaminated surfaces, food, or water. Methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus S. Breaking News In Yuba County. Featured Scripted Television. The Handmaid's Tale series. Luis Miguel series. Clarice series. Vikings series. Fargo installment 4. Get Shorty series. Four Weddings And A Funeral series. Perpetual Grace Ltd series. Condor series. Fargo installemt 3. Fargo installment 2.

Fargo installment 1. Mom series. Teen Wolf series. Featured Unscripted Television. Bad-manners politics—swearing, political incorrectness and, in general, rejecting the typical rigid language of technocratic politics—is also common. More generally, populist movements try to connect with the culture of ordinariness. The people and their general will are defined in relation to outsiders.

Outsider status is targeted primarily at elites. The elites can include not only mainstream politicians and business leaders but also a cultural elite—cosmopolitans whose sense of identity is seen as unconstrained by borders and condescending towards the ways of life of the true people. The elite class is painted as part of a self-serving cartel that controls the apparatus of the state, including mainstream political parties and the bureaucracy.

Outsiders can also include immigrants, refugees, racial or religious minorities and criminals. Populists often explicitly affiliate these others with the elite. For example, they may argue that elites opened the borders to immigration, which threatens the well-being of the people.

In this sense, populism can exclude both the elite and marginalised communities in the same breath. Populism is defined not by who is targeted by the politics of anger and resentment, but by the fact that populists draw the line between insiders and outsiders in the first place.

This is what makes populism fundamentally anti-pluralist. By defining the people—and delegitimising the status of those outside this boundary—populists throw into question one of the most fundamental prerequisites of democracy itself: agreement on who can legitimately participate in politics.

The rhetorical division between the people and outsiders is a powerful political tool. Populists rarely create social cleavages from scratch. Rather, they exploit and stoke social cleavages that have often been simmering under the surface of politics for many years.

What is more, populists dramatise social divisions as threats to the nation and elevate them to a matter of national urgency. Populists dramatise social divisions by using a rhetoric of crisis. They first identify a particular failure. The failures vary: they could be the threat that immigrant communities pose to national unity and culture, the threat drug users or criminals pose to national safety, or the threat that cheap imported goods pose to national jobs and production.

Populists are adept at linking failures in one policy area to failures in another, making them appear part of a broad and systematic chain of unfulfilled demands. By doing so, they make the crisis feel both widespread and urgent. Common to many of the crises identified by populists is a sense that the political elites across all mainstream political parties have conspired to depoliticise an important policy question that should be subject to public scrutiny.

In some countries, mainstream political parties have come to a cross-party consensus, for example, about openness to trade, openness to immigration or EU accession; and opposition to these significant policies has no vehicle for representation.

The fundamental crisis, then, is one of political representation: by taking important policy issues off the table, elites fail to represent the people. Populists lay the blame for the crisis at the feet of the political class that failed to protect the people.

They also group in other outsiders who are the targets of their exclusionary politics as beneficiaries of the crisis.

For example, populist anti-immigration parties present national unity as an urgent crisis that must be addressed. While they blame political elites from mainstream parties for open immigration policies—and for denying the general will of the true people—they blame immigrant communities for benefiting too much from living in their countries, such as by allegedly profiting from welfare policies. Performing a national crisis helps populists fully divide the people from the others.

Even if societal divisions long preceded the rise of populism, the rhetoric of crisis elevates the task of solving these divisions to a matter of national urgency. This provides the backdrop for populists to present themselves as having the answer to the crisis and for the argument that strong leadership is needed to address it.

Once populists have defined the people and outsiders and how outsiders imperil the nation , they claim that nothing should constrain the will of the true people. This claim provides a basis for the arguments that only the strong leadership of a populist leader can extract the nation from crisis and that nothing should stand between populists and their base.

As defining a crisis helps populists rhetorically divide the people from outsiders, so crisis also provides the pretext for strong and unconstrained leadership, unfettered by inconvenient institutions like other branches of government. This provides important justification for undermining and discrediting mainstream political parties, civil-society organisations and the media. It is easy to see, then, how populism can come into conflict with liberal democracy.

Independent institutions, like the judiciary, play an essential role in safeguarding fundamental rights; to do so, they must remain independent from politics. Yet, this independence also means that they can make decisions that run counter to popular opinion.

Populist movements cast these independent institutions as an assault on the sovereignty of the people. Ultimately, the question of how populism shapes democracy is an empirical one, but it is hard to deny that populism puts democracy under strain. The actual policies that populists present to address crisis are typically simplistic and gloss over the many complexities of policymaking.

The solutions are less about having a convincing answer to a real challenge than about convincing supporters that, unlike the establishment elite, populists see and acknowledge the crisis and that their strong leadership alone can fix it. Once populists have defined a national crisis, these intermediary institutions become obstacles that stand in the way of solving the crisis, things to be bulldozed over in the name of getting things done.

Given that strong leadership is needed, populists position themselves as the sole saviours of the people from crisis. To do so, populists often portray themselves as the heroic embodiments of important historical figures, fulfilling national destinies and carrying the mantles of history.

Former Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi is more forceful, portraying himself as the Jesus Christ of Italian politics, the one sacrificing himself for the whole. By portraying themselves as the heirs of these important national figures, populists can gain support by benefiting from the emotional appeal of historical leaders.

For populists, actors and institutions that typically mediate the connection between politicians and voters—such as the media, political parties and civil-society organisations—thwart the will of the people to serve special interests.

Instead, populists emphasise direct and unmediated forms of communication with their supporters. Social media has also become a powerful populist tool by enabling a direct connection between the people and their voice. Thus, rather than connecting to voters through a policy platform and political parties, populists tend to reach voters in a much more personalistic way.

This is quite different from pluralism, which emphasises civil-society groups as the key link between citizens and the state. In a nonpopulist democratic setting, political parties are typically responsible for selecting candidates and debating a policy platform.

There is little scope for them to do so in a populist framework. Populism allows a single answer to who should represent the people and, similarly, little room for debate about policy ideas. Political compromise becomes antithetical to populist politics: not only are political opponents viewed as less legitimate members of the political community, but compromise is also painted as a betrayal of the will of the people.

Populists do sometimes create and use political organisations. Whereas some populist leaders have direct and unmediated linkages with their followers, others build dense party or civil-society organisations to structure and discipline followers. Yet, populist movements are not like other, nonpopulist social movements in at least one key respect: the allegiance of the rank and file to the movement centres on the leader, and the masses have little means of establishing any political autonomy from him or her.

Alternatively, populists can organise their own political parties or co-opt the structures of existing parties to rally their base. The key is that populists attack and delegitimise any possible opposition to their rule.

Thus, populists are not universally against institutions. In sum, populism is the combination of two claims: the people are locked into conflict with outsiders; and nothing should constrain the will of the true people. Populism can be identified according to the prevalence of these two claims. This minimal definition of populism is appealing because it enables the phenomenon to be examined across a wide range of countries and contexts. It also does not link populism with any particular set of social or economic policies or any specific constituency.

The following chapter lays out three main types of populism. Populism varies according to the portrayal of which actors in society belong to the pure people and which to the outsiders. Populism manifests itself so differently across contexts that it is hard to think about its effects on political institutions without taking these variations into account.

There are three broad ways of demarcating the people and the elite, frequently used by populist candidates and parties: cultural, socio-economic and anti-establishment. These types of populism are distinguished by how political elites use populist discourse to sow divisions see table 1. So, for example, populists who invoke cultural populism define the main crisis facing the nation as a cultural one: outsiders and cosmopolitan elites threaten the cultural continuity of the native nation-state.

This does not necessarily mean, however, that the supporters of cultural populism are motivated wholly by cultural concerns. Concerns about declining economic status can raise the effectiveness of cultural appeals. S1 : S57—S Similarly, supporters of socio-economic populism may be motivated equally by concerns about cultural exclusion and by economic anxieties. Nonetheless, cultural and socio-economic populism differ in how populist leaders frame the key crisis facing the nation and the key divisions between the people and outsiders.

Some populists combine elements of all three forms of populism, weaving together cultural crises with economic ones and using both to justify purging the establishment.

Likewise, some populist voters are motivated by multiple perceived problems and do not view populist leaders solely through an economic, cultural or anti-establishment lens. This analysis attempts to classify populists based on the primary crisis that they emphasise.

However, like classifying populism itself, cleanly dividing between the categories is an imperfect exercise. Cultural populists claim that only members of a native group belong to the true people and that new entrants or cultural outsiders pose a threat to the nation-state.

Thus, cultural populist parties often have issue ownership in their countries over immigration and over debates, ethnic diversity and identity politics. Those defined as outsiders can include members of mainstream political parties who, by agreeing across party lines on the overall openness of the country to immigration even if they disagree on levels or on EU accession, have removed immigration as an important point of policy debate.

For cultural populists, outsiders also include cultural elites tied to cosmopolitanism and to opening borders and culture to outsiders. Emphasis on culture does not necessarily coincide with traditionally conservative economic policy. For this reason, the traditional right and left labels are not used here, as nativism can be combined with left-wing economic policy and inclusionary populism can be combined with conservative economic policy.

This type of populism could include everything from anti-immigrant manifestations in Europe and North America to Islamic populism in Turkey and Indonesia. Cultural populism also includes law-and-order populism, in which criminals are cast as the primary enemies of the people who are threatening the character of the country, such as is being seen with the rise of Bolsonaro in Brazil and Duterte in the Philippines.

Among socio-economic populists, there is a reverence for the common worker. The pure people belong to a specific social class, which is not necessarily constrained by national borders. For example, socio-economic populists may see working classes in neighbouring countries as natural allies. The corrupt elites can include big businesses, capital owners, state elites, and foreign forces and international institutions that prop up an international capitalist system.

In general, socio-economic populists strongly resist foreign influence in domestic markets. In some manifestations, socio-economic populism can have an ethnic dimension.

However, the ethnic dimension is inclusionary rather than exclusionary: in contrast to cultural populism, which is based on the idea that some should be excluded from the people, socio-economic populism may advocate the inclusion of previously marginalised ethnic groups as core members of the working class. Although all forms of populism tend to be anti-establishment, this form of populism is different from both cultural and socio-economic populism in that the conflict is primarily with establishment elites rather than with any specific ethnic or social group.

In cultural populism, establishment elites are implicated primarily through their role in enabling too much cultural openness; in socio-economic populism, establishment elites are implicated mainly through their role in empowering economic elite and foreign interests. For anti-establishment populists, the pure people are the honest, hard-working citizens who are preyed on by an elite-run state that serves special interests, and these elites are the primary enemy of the people.

Thus, anti-establishment populism often emphasises ridding the state of corruption and purging prior regime loyalists. Because anti-establishment populism focuses on political elites as the enemy, it can in some cases be less socially divisive than either cultural or socio-economic populism, which, in addition to casting political elites as the enemy, also paint members of society as outsiders.

This variant of populism has often been wedded to an economic affiliation with market liberalism. Although it may seem an odd combination at first blush, there is significant history, especially in Latin America and Eastern Europe, of fusing populism with market liberalism.

This project aims to build a systematic understanding of how populists govern, including how they reshape state institutions, how they may or may not erode the quality of liberal democracy, and the economic policies that they implement.

To understand these questions across a wide range of social, economic and political contexts, a global accounting of populism in power is necessary. To make the project cross-regional, the focus of this project is on both leaders and parties that can be classified as populist.

While parliamentary systems tend to give precedence to political parties, presidential systems favour individual leaders.

This analysis focuses on populist parties and leaders who attained executive office in at least minimally democratic countries between and Venezuela is a bit of an odd case. By the time he died in office in , Venezuela had backslid into autocracy.

However, we include the Maduro regime in the database as it is really one long spell of populism in the country. While little is known about the origin of many of the magic formulas, it is probable that they are the result of translations of knowledge of Arabic oriental magic fused with Western elements. Note: The files are hosted on Google Drive. If you encounter a problem with the download, please leave a comment below. Practical handbooks for daily concerns like stopping a toothache, retrieving stolen goods, and protecting livestock.

Contains reproductions of the original, Old Norwegian pages facing the English translation. Includes an account of a 17th-century Norwegian witch trial. Like many grimoires, it claims a tradition originating with King Solomon. Irish Witchcraft and Demonology, first published in , is a survey of the Witch persecutions in Ireland from the 14th century to the early 19th century.

It also covers a wide array of other paranormal events such as poltergeists, ghosts, and apparations. Very readable, yet well documented, this book has extensive and fascinating quotes from historical source documents. Hohman was a Pennsylvania Dutch healer; the book is a collection of home- and folk-remedies, as well as spells and talismans. It is an attempt to document various famous grimoires, explain the history behind them refuting many of the legends surrounding them , discuss the theology contained therein e.

This work is one of a number of manuscripts crafted towards the end of the s well into the s containing material related to all aspects of the occult; mesmerism, ceremonial magic, the black arts, talismans, and more. What is interesting, here, is that all of the above and more are contained in one work, instead of separately.

It was highly regarded by Islamic and European alchemists as the foundation of their art. Though attributed to the legendary Hellenistic figure Hermes Trismegistus, the text of the Emerald Tablet first appears in a number of early medieval Arabic sources, the oldest of which dates to the late eighth or early ninth century. The book describes several demons as well as the rituals to summon them in order to make a pact with them.

Author S.